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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure using dataset from 33 listed and non-listed 
companies during the period 2003 – 2007 in Ghana.  A multiple regression analysis of pooled-cross sectional 
and time-series observations have been employed in the analysis.  The results identify long-term debt to be 
irrelevant component of capital structure of large unquoted and quoted firms in Ghana as there is a greater 
reliance on equity.  Furthermore, profitability, size, business risk and tangible assets have positive correlation 
with level of gearing of companies in Ghana.  On the other hand, growth, and tax indicate a negative correlation 
with the level of gearing. 
Keywords: Capital structure, financing decisions, listed, non-listed, Ghana. 
  
1.0  Introduction 
Empirical studies into how firms are financed have been predominant in the United States and other developed 
countries. Among such studies are; Modigliani and Miller (1958), Myers (1977), Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999), Bevan and Danbolt (2000 and 2002), Antoniou et al., (2002), and Hall 
et al (2004). Booth et al, (2001), in their comparative study of capital structure of firms in ten developing 
countries, confirm that determinants of capital structure of firms in developing countries are similar to those in 
developed countries. In addition, other studies in respect of developing countries have been carried out by 
(Pandey, 2001; Chen, 2004; Omet and Nobanee, 2001 and Deesomsak et al, 2004). All these studies have 
concluded that there are similarities in the determinants of capital structure in developed and developing 
countries. 
There are  studies in Ghana that have examined the determinants of capital structure of Ghanaian firms by 
comparing the capital structures of quoted firms, large unquoted firms, and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
(Abor and Biekpe, 2005a, 2005b; Abor 2007, 2008). However this study takes a slight paradigm shift, in that it 
strategically focuses on both large quoted and unquoted firms in Ghana. It seeks to answer the question: what are 
the determinants of capital structure of Ghanaian firms? 
 
2.0 Literature Review 
The theoretical and empirical studies have revealed that capital structures chosen by companies are based on the 
agency cost of debt to equity (Jensen and Macklin 1976, Harris and Raviv 1991).  The main determinants of 
capital structure according to Harris and Raviv (1990) are: tangibility, non-debt shields, growth opportunities, 
volatility, profitability, tax and size.  These variables influence the ratio of capital structure.  Furthermore, Harris 
and Raviv, (1990), in their studies on US firms suggest that “leverage increases with fixed assets, non-debt tax 
shields, investment opportunities and firm size and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditure, bankruptcy, 
profitability”.   
Abor and Biekpe (2005) indicate that total debt constitutes more than half of the capital of listed firms in Ghana. 
The results also show positive relationship between debt ratios (capital structure) and firm size and growth, while 
asset tangibility, risk, corporate tax and profitability are negatively related to debt ratios. The results generally 
support the pecking order theory proposed by the theoretical model. 
Previous studies have confirmed that a firm with lower tangible assets will pay high cost of debt as compared to 
a firm with high fixed assets (Ryen and Vasconcellos 1997, Williamson, 1988 and Titman 1984). Tangible assets 
represent sound collateral for loans. Consequently, lenders are willing to grant loans to firms whose level of 
tangible assets is high. However, most of these studies are based on the developed countries (Harris and Raviv 
(1990), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999) and Friend and Lang (1988). However, Wiwattanakantang 
(1999), Um (2001), Booth et al, (2001), and Huang and Song (2002) find that tangible assets are negatively 
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related to leverage based on studies on developing countries.  Moreover, Bevan and Danbolt (2000) suggest 
positive correlation between assets and long-term debt.  Alternatively the relationship between tangible asset and 
short-term debt is negative.   
The relationship between profitability and leverage of firms has received attention.  Empirical and theoretical 
studies on this area have given mixed results.  Kester (1986), Rajan and Zingales (1995) Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Toy et al. (1974) suggest profit to be negatively correlated with leverage. Peterson and Rajan (1994) 
and Long and Maltiz (1985), on the other hand, find a positive relationship between profitable and debt ratios. 
Profitable firms could rely on debt because they generate enough profits strengthening their ability to pay back 
loans. But Myers and Majluf (1984) state that the pecking order theory of capital structure assumes that 
information asymmetry causes companies to prefer internally generated finance to other sources of finance.  
They predict an inverse relationship between profitability and debt on the premise that profitable companies are 
less likely to rely on debt finance because they are able at raise funds internally from accumulated profits. The 
work of Bradley et al. (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Antoniou et al. (2002) 
and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) in developed countries and Booth et al. (2001), Pandey (2001), Um (2001), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Chen (2004) and Al-sakran (2001) in developing countries suggest that profit 
negatively correlates with leverage. 
Another important determinant of capital structure is size of the firm. Large companies tend to choose long-term 
debt and small companies tend to rely on short-term debt (Marsh, 1982).  The size of a firm plays a vital role in 
the negotiation for debt. Large firms can negotiate for long-term debt because they can have influence on the 
creditors.  Also large firms are more diversified than small firms and have a more stable cash flow.  However, 
previous studies into size in relation to capital structure have given mixed results.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
argue that the effect of size on equilibrium leverage is more ambiguous.  Large firms tend to be more diversified 
and fail less often, so size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy.” Barclay and Smith (1995) 
suggest that a firm with high intangible asset will borrow debt at high cost and a firm with high tangible assets 
can use the assets as collateral hence borrow debt at cheaper cost.  
The level of information disclosure is very high in larger firms compared to smaller firms.  For example large 
firms are obliged by law to publish and disclose information based on the standards and regulations.  On other 
hand, small companies are not under any obligations and regulations.  Fama and Jesnsen (1983) and Friend and 
Lang (1988) argue that a large firm tends to provide more information to lenders than a small firm.  Managers 
prefer to finance investment by equity capital because of asymmetric information cost and this in effect causes a 
negative relationship between size and leverage. Marsh (1982), Rajan and Zingales, Booth et al. (2001) and 
Wald (1999) confirm that gearing is positively correlated with the size of a company. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
report a positive correlation between the size of the firm and the total debt ratio and the long-term debt ratio.  
However Bevan and Danbolt (2002) confirmed that size is found to be negatively related to short-term and 
positively related in the long-term.  
Growth of the firm is critical to the capital structure of firms. Empirical studies confirm that growth 
opportunities are negatively correlated with gearing (Titman and Wesseles 1988).  In their research Thies et al. 
(1992) and Basking (1989) report that growth opportunities normally divert capital from equity to debt.  
Furthermore, growth opportunities bring demand for more capital but when the demand is more than the supply 
the company would have to look for alternative sources of financing.  Once the retained profit would be 
insufficient to finance the growth opportunities and additional issue of new shares would bring additional cost 
because of the asymmetric information, the only alternative is debt financing.  In this context, financing the 
investment will transfer the wealth from shareholders to debt holders.  The empirical and theoretical studies from 
Booth et al. (2001), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Wald (1999) confirm that growth opportunities positively 
correlate with gearing.  
 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) have argued that companies will prefer debt capital because of the tax shield on 
interest.  On the other hand, tax shield from depreciation and other provisions will discourage some management 
to arrange for debt capital according to DeAngelo and Marsalis (1980). 
In conclusion the limitations and associated cost of debt and equity funding have called for other sources of 
financing for firms. Most theories have sought to explain capital structure by introducing frictions omitted in the 
Modigliani and Miller framework (Taggart, 1989). The static trade-off model (Myers, 1977) emphasized that 
capital structure is determined by the agency cost of financial distress and the tax-deductibility of debt finance. 
These problems of agency cost have been emphasized by Jensen (1986) in his free cash flow theory and formally 
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modelled by Stulz (1990). Alternatively, (Myers and Majluf, 1984) emphasizes in their pecking order theory that 
the friction due to asymmetric information between managers and outside investors influences firms to rely on 
internal funds than external funds. Thus, there exists a financial hierarchy descending from internal funds, to 
debt, and to external equity. (Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984).  
 
3.0 Research Methodology 
3.1 Data Sources 
Data have been collected from the financial statements of 33 listed companies and unlisted companies and the 
Ghana Stock Exchange Fact Book 2007. The study period is 2003-2007. 
The sample consists of 5 years data from 2003 – 2007 for 33 companies. It is generally recognised under Central 
Limit Theorem that in a sample of 30, distribution is approximately normal and the results statistical tests 
performed are meaningful (Grinstead and Snell, 2000). Thus our sample size of 33 companies is reasonable.  
The multiple regression model given below was used to calculate the relationship between the dependent 
variable and independent variables (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). 
Geai =Ả + βẂ1 Pro1 + βẂ2 Asset1 + β Ẃ3 Size1 + β Ẃ4 Risk +β Ẃ5 Gro1 + βẂ6T1 + ê 
Where: 
Geai (Gearing)  =  Long-term debt/ capital employed 
Ả   =  Intercept coefficient 
β  =  Slope coefficient for independent variable  
Ẃ1 Pro1 (Profitability) =  Earning before interest and Tax / Total assets    
Ẃ2 Asset1 (Tangible assets)  =  Net fixed assets / Total assets 
Ẃ3 Size1 (Size of company) =  Log of sale value    
Ẃ4Risk1 (Business risk) =  percentage change in operating profit                                                                                   
Ẃ5 Gro1 (Growth) =  Percentage change in total assets 
Ẃ6T1 (Tax)  =  Operating income after interest and tax payments to  
 total assets. 
 ê =  Regression error terms. 
The regression analysis was carried out between the dependent variable (debt) and the independent variables 
such as; tangible assets, profitability, size of firm, growth opportunities, and business risk and non-debt tax. Data 
for this study are pooled cross sectional and time series observations. Specifically, data for the six variables 
(assets tangibility, profitability, company size, growth opportunity, risk (volatility), and taxation) for thirty three 
(33) Ghanaian companies were collected for the period of 2003-2007, a total of 198 pooled observations.  
 
4.0 Results and Discussion  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 below provides descriptive statistics information for the full sample of the companies. The mean debt 
ratio (measured by total debt to total capital) of the sample companies is 28%, and median is 23%. This implies 
that in Ghana equity financing represents 72% contrary to Abor and Biekpe (2005). Company size determined as 
the natural logarithm of turnover had a mean and median of 13.273 and 13.298 respectively. Asset tangibility 
had a mean of 0.582. This indicates that, on average, fixed assets accounted for 58.20% of total assets. 
Profitability, given as the ratio of EBIT to total assets, registered a mean value of 0.1215 suggesting a return on 
assets of 12.15%. Risk is measured as the variability of EBIT and this showed a mean (median) of -0.5900 (-
0.1330). The mean for growth (measured as growth in total assets) was 0.1130. This indicates that, on average, 
growth rate in total assets was 11.30% during the five-year period. Corporate tax rate on average was 7.39 
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Table 4.1               Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample 
  Debit 
ratio 
Profitability Tangibility Size 
(Logsales) 
Business 
risk % 
Growth % Taxation 
N Valid 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
  Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean .27864 .12145 .58200 13.27376 -.59009 .11309 .07394 
Std. Error of 
Mean 
.041540 .029004 .072146 .363112 .158317 .027308 .017914 
Median .23000 .07500 .54600 13.29800 -.13300 .11000 .04900 
Std. Deviation .238629 .166615 .414445 2.085917 .909463 .156871 .102908 
Variance .057 .028 .172 4.351 .827 .025 .011 
Skewness .913 3.269 4.196 .201 -.993 -.264 2.904 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.409 .409 .409 .409 .409 .409 .409 
Kurtosis -.489 13.925 21.699 -.731 -.844 -.898 10.907 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.798 .798 .798 .798 .798 .798 .798 
Range .779 .963 2.572 7.630 2.650 .551 .589 
Minimum .010 -.075 .110 9.854 -2.311 -.185 -.069 
Maximum .789 .888 2.682 17.484 .339 .366 .520 
 
The output generated from multiple regression has been summarized in table 4.2 below. It can be deduced from 
the table that the R Square values in model 1 shows 55.4% of the variance. The R square change value of 55.4% 
means that the independent variable explains 55.4% of the variance in the dependent variable. This is a 
statistically significant contribution as indicated by the Sig. F Change value (0.001).  Furthermore the Adjusted R 
Square of 45.1% explains the power in the variation in the firm’s financial level. Therefore, approximately 45.1% 
of the variation in the firm’s level of finance can be explained by the six independent variables in the model. 
This explanatory power is comparable to that obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Bevan and Danbolt, 
(2000, 2002).  
 
Table 4.2                                  Model Summary  
 
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Tax, Business risk %, Growth %, Tangibility, Size           (Logsales), Profitability 
b. Dependent Variable: Debit ratio 
 
The ANOVA table 4.3 below contains an output analysis that tests whether the model as a whole is significantly 
better at predicting the outcome than using the mean as a best guess. From the table below it can be said that this 
analysis is significant because the P-value of 0.001 is less than the alpha level of 0.05.  
  
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Change Statistics 
          
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .744(a) .554 .451 .176790 .554 5.384 6 26 .001 
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 Table 4.3                                          ANOVA  
 
Model   
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regressio
n 1.010 6 .168 5.384 .001(a) 
Residual .813 26 .031     
Total 1.822 32       
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Taxation, Business risk %, Growth %, Tangibility, Size (Logsales), Profitability 
b. Dependent Variable: Debit ratio 
 
4.2  Correlation Coefficient 
Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between the firm-level variables and leverage. Table 
4.4 below indicates the correlation coefficient. These estimates tell about the relationship between the 
independent variables and dependent variable. It shows the amount of increase in dependent variable that would 
be predicted by an increase in the predictor if the effects of all other predictors are held constant. In addition, 
because the calculation is based on one (1) tailed p-value for testing the independent variables that the coefficient 
is zero, the p-value will not be divided by two (2) before comparing it to alpha. The constant is significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 alpha levels. For example, for the independent variables which are not significant, 
the coefficients are not significantly different from zero, thus giving no cause for concern about multi-
collinearity among the regressors. 
 
Table 4.4          Coefficient Correlations 
Model     Taxation 
Business 
risk % Growth % Tangibility 
Size 
(Logsales) Profitability 
1 Correlations Taxation 1.000 .069 -.030 -.331 -.171 -.161 
    Business 
risk % .069 1.000 .152 -.176 .061 -.308 
    Growth % -.030 .152 1.000 -.016 -.376 -.333 
    Tangibility -.331 -.176 -.016 1.000 -.082 .203 
    Size 
(Logsales) -.171 .061 -.376 -.082 1.000 .223 
    Profitability -.161 -.308 -.333 .203 .223 1.000 
  Covariances Taxation .111 .001 -.002 -.009 -.001 -.011 
    Business 
risk % .001 .001 .001 -.001 -005 -.002 
    Growth % -.002 .001 .052 .000 -.001 -.016 
    Tangibility -.009 -.001 .000 .007 .000 .004 
    Size 
(Logsales) -.001 -.005 -.001 .000 .000 .001 
    Profitability -.011 -.002 -.016 .004 .001 .046 
a. Dependent Variable: Debt ratio 
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Table 4.5                                        Coefficients 
Model   
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval for B Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
    Beta     
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Zero-
order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   1.609 .120 -.100 .822           
  Profitability .062 .417 .680 -.350 .529 -.110 .082 .055 .769 1.300 
  Tangibility .124 .863 .396 -.099 .242 .061 .167 .113 .828 1.207 
  Size 
(Logsal .019 .126 .901 -.033 .037 -.273 .025 .016 .772 1.296 
  Business 
risk % .112 .793 .435 -.047 .105 .219 .154 .104 .867 1.154 
  Growth % -.706 4.714 .000 -1.542 -.605 -.715 -.679 -.617 .765 1.307 
   Taxation -.144 1.003 .325 -1.020 .351 -.203 -.193 -.131 .829 1.206 
a. Dependent Variable: Debt ratio 
4.3 Profitability  
The result from this study is that profitability is positively correlated with gearing and this is inconsistent with 
pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984), Rajan and Zingales (1994), Abor and Biekpe (2005). The 
underlying principle is that as firms pursue high level of profits, they tend to borrow to achieve that level of 
business activity and the level of profit. The study also confirms the findings in the study by  Wald (1999). He 
puts it; “profitability has the largest single effect on debt to assets ratios’. However, profitability is technically 
not significant because the p-value of 0.068 is significantly greater than 0.05.  
 4.4 Assets Tangibility 
There is also a positive relationship between assets tangibility and gearing. This empirical finding confirms the 
previous study by Rajan and Zingales (1995).  Firms with high level of assets can use their assets as collateral to 
secure debt finance with less cost. In addition, increasing assets denotes high operating efficiency and could 
attract investors. This is not statistically significant because   the p-value of 0.396 is significantly greater than 
0.05. The results suggest that, for Ghanaian firms, a higher proportion of fixed assets lead to the use of more debt 
financing because of availability of collateral.  
4.5 Company Size  
The results suggest that the bigger the firm in terms of sales or turnover, the more debt it will use. One reason is 
that, larger firms are more diversified and hence have lower variance of earnings, making them able to tolerate 
high debt ratios. Lenders are more willing to lend to larger companies because they are perceived to have lower 
risk levels. Besides, with increasing levels of sales which can translate into earnings, repayment of loans and 
interest should not be a challenge. But smaller firms may find it relatively more costly to resolve issues with 
information asymmetry with lenders, thus limiting their ability to borrow. . This finding is in line with the 
findings of Rajan and Zingales (1995), but contradicts the findings of Marsh (1982) and Titman and Wessels 
(1988) where they identify a contrary negative relationship between gearing and firm size.  However, this 
variable is statistically not significant with a p-value of 0.901. 
4.6 Business Risk  
From the regression analysis, there is a positive correlation between risk and gearing. This presupposes that 
firms with high business risk are more likely to have high level of gearing. Equity investors are usually not keen 
on businesses with high risk. Management of such companies tend to depend on debt than equity. Our finding is 
in line with the previous study by Titman and Wessels (1988) who also find a positive relationship between 
business risk and gearing. It must, however, be noted that this finding is not statistically significant with a  p-
value of 0.435 which is greater than alpha level 0.05. 
 
4.7 Growth   
The results indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between growth and leverage. This is also in 
line with previous studies by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Barton et al (1989). One reason is that, growth puts 
more pressure on retained earnings in the short run according to the pecking order theory. In the long run, 
however, management would seek external sources of funds to finance the increasing growth opportunities. 
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Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between gearing and growth opportunities is rather mixed. It must 
be noted further that while Titman and Wessels (1988), Chung (1993) and Barclay et al. (1995) find a negative 
correlation, Kester (1986) does not find any support for the predicted negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and gearing. However, our study reveals a negative correlation between growth and gearing and a 
statistically significant relationship with a p-value of 0.000.  
4.8 Tax  
The results provided show that there is a negative correlation between corporate tax and gearing. The 
relationship could be attributable to the special tax rebate for listed firms. Firms that go public tend to enjoy tax 
reduction compared to unlisted firms. Companies have an incentive to get listed given the tax incentive they 
receive. Thus, a general increase in corporate tax would be associated with increasing equity capital since firms 
would be encouraged to go public and enjoy the special tax rebate.This variable is statistically not significant 
predictor variable in the regression model because with coefficient of -0.333 the p-value of 0.325 is greater than 
the alpha level.  
 
5.0 Summary, Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The study examines the determinants of capital structure of large unquoted and quoted firms in Ghana. The study 
reveals that long term debt is an unimportant component of capital employed of unquoted and quoted firms in 
Ghana. The results from the multiple regression model reveal that profitability, asset tangibility, company size, 
and business risk correlate positively with gearing. These are, however, not statistically significant. It must be 
noted that the findings are comparable to those obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Abor and Biekpe 
(2005). For growth opportunities and taxation, they correlate negatively with the level of gearing even though 
only business growth is statistically significant based on the regression results.  
In comparison to study conducted by Abor and Biekpe (2005) on twenty two listed companies in Ghana, their 
study reveals that size, tangibility, profitability, risk, and taxation are statistically significant while growth is 
statistically insignificant. This is inversely related to the result of this study. Our study reveals that size, 
tangibility, profitability, risk, and taxation are statistically insignificant while growth is statistically significant. 
These statistical differences between the present study and the aforementioned, might have resulted partially to 
our sources of data, sample size and time (duration of studies) 
The above difference notwithstanding, the Government of Ghana should take into account the need to improve 
the long-term external sources of funds, especially to improve the bond market in Ghana. Also high rate of 
government bonds encourage Ghanaians, investors and other financial institutes to invest in government bond 
rather than corporate investment because of the low risk associated with the government bond investment. 
Therefore an interesting future research on the impact of asymmetric information on determinants of capital 
structure in Ghana is inevitable.   
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